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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 18-1243 
_______________ 
 
FED CETERA, LLC, a New Jersey limited liability company, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NATIONAL CREDIT SERVICES, INC., a Washington 
Corporation 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
D.C. Civil No. 1-17-cv-02809 
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
_______________ 
 
Argued: October 22, 2018 
 
Before: KRAUSE, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  September 17, 2019) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
National Credit Services (National Credit), a debt 
collection agency, sought opportunities to contract with the 
federal government to provide debt collection services.  In the 
hopes of winning such a contract, it reached an Agreement with 
a company called Net Gain, which was in the business of 
offering networking relationships to its clients.  In return for 
introductions, National Credit agreed to pay Net Gain a 
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finder’s fee for any related contract that National Credit 
“consummated” during the term set in the Agreement.  A few 
years later, Net Gain assigned its rights in the Agreement to 
Appellant Fed Cetera.   
 
During the effective period of the Agreement, 
National Credit signed a contract with the federal government.  
It did not begin performance on that contract until late 2016, 
after the Agreement’s applicable period ended.  Because 
National Credit had not begun performance during the contract 
period, it refused to pay Fed Cetera the finder’s fee, arguing 
that it had not “consummated” the federal contract.  Fed Cetera 
sued, and National Credit moved for judgment on the 
pleadings.  
 
After reviewing the Agreement, the District Court 
concluded that the Agreement required some amount of 
performance on the federal contract to trigger a finder’s fee, 
which had not occurred during the Agreement’s relevant 
period.  Thus, it granted judgment in National Credit’s favor.  
Fed Cetera appeals that ruling now.   
 
The question before us, then, is whether the terms of 
the Agreement required some degree of performance while the 
Agreement was in force in order for a contract to be 
“consummated.”  We conclude that it did not, and, for the 
reasons stated here, we reverse.   
 
I. 
 
To win a student debt collection contract from the 
federal government, a debt collector typically must follow a 
convoluted but—within the industry—well-known path.  The 
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company must begin by working as a subcontractor to a current 
federal contractor.  If that subcontract goes well, then the 
company may have an opportunity to receive a direct federal 
contract the next time around.   
 
National Credit sought such an arrangement.  In an 
effort to find a federal contractor with which it could 
subcontract, National Credit sought out Net Gain for 
networking opportunities.  National Credit and Net Gain 
entered into their Agreement on February 1, 2010.  Under that 
agreement, National Credit owed Net Gain—and later Net 
Gain’s assignee Fed Cetera1—the finder’s fee for any related 
contract Net Gain consummated between the signing date and 
February 1, 2016.   
 
Specifically, the Agreement states that National 
Credit owes a fee any time a “Fee Transaction . . . is 
consummated.”2  A “Fee Transaction,” further, can mean either 
one of two things:  (1) “the consummation, with any Federal 
Contractor, of any transaction related to ‘teaming’ or 
‘subcontracting.’”; and (2) the “subsequent consummation of 
any contract with any Federal government agency for which 
the Principal has been invited to compete, and is later awarded 
a contract to perform” where that contract “shall have arisen 
due to any ‘teaming’ or ‘subcontracting’ engagement [Net 
Gain] may have facilitated in advance of any such award.”3  
Once a Fee Transaction is consummated, the fee was “due and 
                                              
1 Net Gain assigned its rights to Fed Cetera in 2013, 
after it had introduced National Credit to the federal contractor 
whose subcontract agreement triggered the first finder’s fee.  
2 App. 27. 
3 Id. 
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payable until fees are no longer generated from any and all Fee 
Transactions, within thirty (30) days after each receipt during 
such period by Principal . . . of revenue resulting from or in any 
way related to the Fee Transaction, including any fees paid 
after the expiration or termination of any contract.”4   
 
In other words, Net Gain agreed to introduce National 
Credit to a federal contractor.  If the introduction worked out, 
National Credit would get a subcontract with that contractor.  
That subcontract could ultimately lead National Credit to win 
a direct federal contract of its own.  National Credit would owe 
Net Gain a 2.5% finder’s fee for both contracts—assuming 
they were “consummated” within the period set by the 
Agreement.  National Credit needed to pay Net Gain that fee 
within thirty days after it received any revenue related to the 
Fee Transactions. 
 
The structure of this arrangement is not at issue.  Nor 
is whether a given contract falls within the terms of the 
Agreement.5  National Credit signed two relevant contracts 
                                              
4 Id. 
5 In its brief, National Credit appears to suggest that Fed 
Cetera has not alleged sufficient facts about the federal 
contract.  See Appellee Br. 16 (“Fed Cetera failed to plead 
anything about the [federal] Contract, including anything about 
the . . . substantive terms.”).  It is unclear to what end National 
Credit offers this argument, but to the extent National Credit 
adds this as a separate ground to challenge the sufficiency of 
Fed Cetera’s pleadings, it is forfeited, as there is no indication 
this was argued before or considered by the District Court.  See 
App. 7 (“For purposes of this motion, the only relevant 
question is whether the execution of the [federal] Contract is a 
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during the Agreement’s operative period.  The first was a 
subcontract with a third-party federal contractor.  National 
Credit regularly made finder’s fee payments for that 
subcontract without apparent dispute.   
 
The second, which is in dispute, was a direct contract 
with the federal government, signed in 2014.  However, 
National Credit did not begin performance on that contract 
until September 2016, several months after the Agreement’s 
term concluded.  Because it had not yet begun performance, 
National Credit refused to pay Fed Cetera the finder’s fee, 
asserting that the language of the Agreement did not require it 
to because no Fee Transaction had been consummated. 
 
Fed Cetera sued.  National Credit moved for judgment 
on the pleadings, arguing that the terms of the contract were 
plainly in its favor.  The District Court agreed with National 
Credit.  The District Court concluded that in order for a Fee 
Transaction to be consummated, the Agreement required some 
                                              
‘consummation’ within the meaning of the agreement.”); App. 
49-52 (detailing National Credit’s arguments before the 
District Court).  The parties in any event agree that the federal 
contract at issue bears the contract number ED-FSA-14-D-
0018, and, as a federal contract, is a matter of public record, 
which we may consider here.  See Pension Tr. Fund for 
Operating Eng’rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization Transactions, 
Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 271 (3d Cir. 2013).  The particulars of the 
federal contract are otherwise irrelevant to the question on 
appeal, which concerns only whether, under the terms of the 
Agreement, it was consummated during the Agreement’s 
applicable period.  Whether National Credit actually owes any 
fees to Fed Cetera is a question for another day.    
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degree of performance on the contract.  Since National Credit 
had not yet begun that performance by the end of the 
Agreement’s applicable period, the federal contract fell outside 
the terms of the Agreement, and National Credit owed no 
finder’s fee.  The District Court entered judgment in National 
Credit’s favor, and Fed Cetera timely appealed.6   
 
II. 
 
The parties agree that New Jersey law applies.7  “To 
establish a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff has the burden 
to show that the parties entered into a valid contract, that the 
defendant failed to perform his obligations under the contract 
and that the plaintiff sustained damages as a result.”8  Under 
                                              
6 National Credit is a Washington corporation, and Fed 
Cetera is a New Jersey limited liability company.  This is a 
contract dispute between diverse parties, governed by New 
Jersey law.  The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
7 The Court exercises plenary review of judgments on 
the pleadings entered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(c).  Jablonski v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 
290-91 (3d Cir. 1988).  “A motion for judgment on the 
pleadings will be granted . . . if, on the basis of the pleadings, 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  DiCarlo 
v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2008); see Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(c).  We accept the nonmoving party’s factual 
allegations as true and construe all allegations in the light most 
favorable to that party.  Id. 
8 Murphy v. Implicito, 920 A.2d 678, 689 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2007).   
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New Jersey law, courts enforce contracts looking at the intent 
of the parties, “the contractual terms, the surrounding 
circumstances, and the purpose of the contract.”9  “Whether a 
contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law.”10  “If the 
language of a contract is plain and capable of legal 
construction, the language alone must determine the 
agreement’s force and effect.”11  “Even in the interpretation of 
an unambiguous contract, we may consider all of the relevant 
evidence that will assist in determining its intent and 
meaning.”12  If the contract is “ambiguous, the ‘fact-finder 
must attempt to discover what the contracting parties . . . 
intended [the disputed provisions] to mean,’” and accordingly, 
judgment on the pleadings would not be appropriate.13 
 
The only question here is when, under the terms of the 
Agreement, National Credit’s second contract was 
“consummated.”  The Agreement’s applicable period lasted 
                                              
9 Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 633 A.2d 531, 
535 (N.J. 1993). 
10 Tigg Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 
362 (3d Cir. 1987).   
11 Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 85 A.3d 947, 
958-59 (N.J. 2014) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
12 Id. at 959.    
13 Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Del. River Basin 
Comm’n Maya Van Rossum, 894 F.3d 509, 534 (3d Cir. 2018); 
see also Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 140 A.2d 199, 204 
(N.J. 1958) (“The trial judge correctly found the lease to be 
ambiguous . . . .  In those circumstances, it was proper to 
submit the issue of the meaning of the contract to the jury as 
one of fact.”). 
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until February 2016.  If the federal contract was consummated 
before that date, then National Credit owes a finder’s fee.  If it 
was consummated after, then National Credit does not.  
  
The Agreement does not define any form of “to 
consummate.”  Both parties argue that the term “consummate” 
is clear on its face, although they differ on what is clear about 
it.  Fed Cetera argues that, in the context of the Agreement, 
“consummated” means “signed,” “formed,” or “executed,” and 
asserts that National Credit consummated the second contract 
when National Credit executed it with the government in 2014.  
National Credit argues the opposite, asserting that the District 
Court correctly found that “consummated” requires some 
degree of performance of a contract.   
 
New Jersey courts have not provided dispositive 
guidance on the meaning of the term “consummate.”  The cases 
offer competing, context-specific definitions.  The case most 
cited by National Credit and the District Court is Todiss v. 
Garruto, a New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division 
decision.14  Todiss concerned whether a broker was still owed 
a commission from a seller even after a third-party buyer 
backed out.15  The court in Todiss relied on the explicit 
provision in the parties’ agreement that stated “the commission 
was to be ‘contingent upon the transaction being consummated 
and in the event that said transaction is not consummated then 
and in that event no commission shall be payable to said 
brokers.’”16  The court held that “[i]n common acceptation the 
meaning of the transitive verb ‘consummate’ is ‘to bring to 
                                              
14 112 A.2d 285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955) 
15 Id. at 286. 
16 Id. at 289-90. 
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completion that which was intended or undertaken to be 
done.’”17  Todiss concluded that, because the sale never took 
place, the broker wasn’t owed a fee.18   
 
This case, however, does not involve a sale of 
something, and so Todiss is not entirely on point.  A classical 
contract is formed, and the legal duties attach, with offer, 
acceptance and consideration, not upon the completion of some 
sort of performance—except, of course, where acceptance is 
communicated by performance.19  Fed Cetera’s position here, 
then, is consistent with Todiss; what was arguably “brought to 
completion” here was the negotiation and formation of the 
federal contract.   
 
Shortly after Todiss, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
decided Klos v. Mobil Oil Co.20  Klos involved a question of 
when a particular life-insurance policy became effective.  The 
Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff “mailed in his 
completed [insurance] application, he accepted [the insurer’s] 
offer and a contract for insurance was consummated with all of 
the essential elements agreed upon.”21  The Supreme Court 
unambiguously concluded that a contract was “consummated” 
upon acceptance, without any performance necessary on any 
party’s part.  We cannot say then, that New Jersey law requires 
                                              
17 Id. at 287. 
18 Id. at 290. 
19 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 54. 
20 259 A.2d 889, 892 (N.J. 1969). 
21 Id. 
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some performance on a contract before it is consummated.22  
Similarly, our Court and others have held in other 
circumstances that a contract is consummated when formed.23   
 
The next step is to look at the totality of the parties’ 
Agreement, to see whether the language and context make the 
issue clearer.  When the District Court undertook that analysis, 
it read “consummate” in the Agreement to mean to “carr[y] 
out.”24  In doing so, the District Court relied on Todiss, and also 
understood Black’s Law Dictionary to be defining 
“consummate” as “completed”; “fully accomplished.”25   
                                              
22 See also Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 
95 A.2d 391, 397 (N.J. 1953) (“An expression of assent that 
modifies the substance of the tender . . . is yet not an acceptance 
and does not consummate a contract.”); Gamble v. Connolly, 
943 A.2d 202, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. Civ. Div. 2007) [T]here was 
a degree of acceptance on the part of Gamble and an agreement 
was consummated . . . .”). 
23 See Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U.S. 
511, 512 (1930) (“[S]ending written acceptance consummates 
contracts of sale.”); F.A.R. Liquidating Co. v. Brownell, 209 
F.2d 375, 379 (3d Cir. 1954) (assignment of patents 
“consummated” upon deposit of an acceptance cable by a 
certain time).  The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f), 
uses the statutory phrase “consummation of the transaction,” 
which we have interpreted to mean the date upon which the 
parties formed a contract.  See Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. 
Co., 898 F.2d 896, 902-03 (3d Cir. 1990). 
24 App. 9 (rephrasing the Agreement to read “If . . . 
[National Credit] carries out a fee transaction, it shall pay Fed 
Cetera” the finder’s fee). 
25 Id. at 7. 
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The District Court then redefined the term “Fee 
Transaction” in the Agreement.  It used Black’s definition of 
the word “transaction” to redefine the term, and held that “a 
transaction is a noun that means ‘an action.’”26  The District 
Court concluded that, because “consummate” means “to carry 
out,” and a transaction “is a noun that means ‘an action,’” then 
to “consummate a fee transaction” under the Agreement 
“implies two separate actions at distinct times.”27  Using that 
phrasing, the District Court concluded that the Agreement 
“expressly contemplates a contract being awarded and then 
later performed.”28   
 
However, we believe that there are two difficulties 
with the District Court’s analysis.  The first is that the District 
Court relied, in part, on the adjective definition of 
“consummate,” not the verb definition.  The difference is 
relevant; the adjective form of consummate, pronounced “con-
sum-it,”29 carries a different meaning and different common 
usage.  A person who is “the consummate statesman,” or has 
“consummate elegance,” is the fulfillment of an ideal; 
complete and satisfied in all respects.  Upon hearing something 
is a “consummate contract,” a typical listener is more likely to 
understand it as an archetypal contract, not a contract that has 
been performed in some respect. 
 
                                              
26 Id. at 9. 
27 Id. 
28 App. 10 (emphasis omitted). 
29 Or “känsəmət” in the International Phonetic 
Alphabet.  
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Looking at the correct Black’s definition—the verb 
definition—makes it clearer that “consummate,” pronounced 
“con-sum-ayt,”30 carries less emphasis on something being 
fulfilled or fully completed.  While the verb can still mean “to 
bring to completion,” it can also mean “to achieve” or “to 
perfect.”  To “achieve” a contract suggests that a contract has 
formed, not that a party started performance on a contract.  
 
A second error poses a greater problem.  After 
defining “to consummate,” the District Court then used Black’s 
to further define the “transaction” in “Fee Transaction” to 
mean “a noun that means ‘an action.’”31  The District Court 
used its definitions of “to consummate” and “transaction” to 
conclude that a “consummated Fee Transaction” in the 
Agreement implied two separate actions occurring at different 
times.   
 
But unlike “consummate,” “Fee Transaction” is a 
defined term in the Agreement.  The Black’s definition, or any 
common use of the word “transaction,” is irrelevant.  The 
parties bargained for an explicit definition that supersedes any 
others.  The District Court erred by substituting its definition 
for the parties’ own. 
 
As the parties define it, a “Fee Transaction” means 
“the consummation” or “subsequent consummation” of one of 
the two listed types of debt collection contracts.  In other 
words, under the Agreement, National Credit owes a fee when 
“a consummation [of a relevant contract] is consummated.”  
While an awkward construction, the phrase’s meaning is no 
                                              
30 Or “känsəmāt” in International Phonetic Alphabet. 
31 App. 9. 
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less apparent than “an achievement is achieved” or “an 
agreement is agreed upon.”  None of those constructions imply 
a two-step process, as the District Court read the Agreement to 
require. 
 
So evaluating the Agreement using the terminology 
and word definitions outlined above, a Fee Transaction is 
consummated when it is formed, not when performance has 
begun.  While it is conceivable that another contract might use 
“consummate” in a way that refers to performance, both the 
text of the Agreement and the actions of the parties indicate 
that is not the case here.  The Agreement states that any fee 
“shall be due and payable until fees are no longer generated 
from any and all Fee Transactions, within thirty (30) days after 
each receipt during such period by Principal . . . of revenue.”32  
Accordingly, the Agreement contemplates the ongoing 
payment of the finder’s fee throughout the life of a relevant 
contract every time National Credit received revenue from its 
work on the contract.  Because fees are owed only after a 
contract is “consummated,” the Agreement cannot be using 
“consummation” to mean “fully complete performance on the 
contract.”  This is consistent with National Credit’s own 
behavior, which concedes Fed Cetera’s allegation that it 
regularly paid the finder’s fee throughout the life of the first 
contract—not at the completion of work on that contract. 
   
This interpretation also comports with the parties’ 
business relationship under the Agreement as a practical 
matter.  The Agreement envisions that Fed Cetera’s—formerly 
Net Gain’s—role is strictly that of a “[f]inder[]”:  Its job is to 
                                              
32 App. 27. 
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procure contracts for National Credit by making 
“introduc[tions]” and “assisting . . . with negotiations,” but it 
does not play any role in National Credit’s performance of 
work under those contracts.33  Its only function is to facilitate 
National Credit’s successful formation of contracts.  Assuming 
the parties are rational actors,34 the economics of the contract 
are plausible only if Fed Cetera’s compensation turns on the 
satisfactory completion of its function—not events, like 
performance by National Credit, that post-date the only service 
Fed Cetera performs and are outside of its control.  If the 
compensation provision were structured the way National 
Credit contends, Fed Cetera could lose out on a commission, 
to National Credit’s gain, simply because of gamesmanship by 
National Credit or mere happenstance.  If Fed Cetera helped 
National Credit negotiate and form a contract with a third party 
shortly before the end of the Agreement’s term, for example, 
National Credit avoid paying Fed Cetera from simply by 
delaying the start of its work for the third party, or because the 
third party is slow to delegate work to National 
Credit.  Reading a contract to produce this sort of “absurd 
result” is disfavored.35   
 
The only way to understand “consummation” under 
the Agreement in a manner consistent with New Jersey law, 
                                              
33 App. 26. 
34 See Holtham v. Lucas, No. A-3073-17T1, 2019 WL 
2998225, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 10, 2019) 
(“[T]raditional contract law principles . . .  are founded on the 
premise that contracting parties are rational economic actors . 
. . .”) 
35 Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 206 A.3d 
386, 392 (N.J. 2019). 
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the word definitions, context within the Agreement, the 
parties’ own behavior, and their relationship as envisioned by 
the Agreement, is to understand it to mean forming a qualifying 
contract.36  Alternative readings would render other terms 
superfluous or internally inconsistent and would not accord 
with the parties’ own behavior.  
   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District 
Court will be reversed and the judgment on the pleadings in 
favor of National Credit vacated.  This matter will be remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
                                              
36 To underscore the weakness of National Credit’s 
position, we note that even if we were to conclude that the 
Agreement’s language is ambiguous, that would also require 
us to reverse because, as explained above, the meaning of the 
contract would become a fact question for a jury.  See Wayne 
Land & Mineral Grp. LLC, 894 F.3d at 534.  Whatever 
arguments one can make about the best reading of 
“consummate” in the Agreement, the notion that it 
unambiguously reflects National Credit’s proposed 
interpretation is not plausible. 
